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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Rose appeals from his judgment of conviction entered upon his conditional guilty
plea for aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol. Specifically, he asserts that the
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress with respect to a draw of his blood. The
district court felt compelled to deny the motion on the grounds of stare decisis.

Mr. Rose

acknowledges that he did not demonstrate that he revoked his implied consent; he was
unconscious at the time. He therefore respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its prior
decisions which have held that implied consent justifies warrantless blood draws unless the
suspect withdraws that consent.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts are taken from the district court’s order on the motion to suppress:1
On July 1, 2016, Detective Mumford was dispatched to Clagstone Road near Custer Street in
reference to a two car collision. (R., p.105.) The drivers of the two vehicles were transported to
Kootenai County Medical Center because of the severity of their injuries. (R., p.105.) At some
unknown point in time, Detective Mumford was told by an unknown person or persons that
Mr. Rose, one of the drivers, had been drinking alcohol. (R., p.105.) When near Mr. Rose,
Detective Mumford smelled the odor of alcohol coming from his person. (R., p.105.) He

1

No testimony was introduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress. (See generally, 5/3/17
Tr.) Instead, the parties stipulated to the admission of State’s Exhibit 1, a report prepared by
Detective Munson. (5/3/17 Tr., pp.1-13.) According to this report, when the detective inquired
about securing a sample of his blood, “[Mr.] Rose could not talk when I asked if he understood
what I had read him and he did not respond or refuse.” (State’s Exhibit 1.) Counsel for
Mr. Rose stated that “the facts that we did come to agreement to are that when Detective
Mumford contacted Mr. Rose, he was fully unconscious and intubated.” (5/3/17 Tr., p.6, Ls.1820.)
1

requested medical staff draw Mr. Rose’s blood, without a warrant, because he feared a blood
draw after Mr. Rose’s imminent surgery would not accurately reflect his level of intoxication at
the time of the traffic collision. (R., p.105.) A registered nurse employed by the Kootenai
Medical Center drew Mr. Rose’s blood. (R., p.105.)
Prior to the blood draw, Mr. Rose’s pants were removed and placed into an opaque
plastic bag, not at the direction of law enforcement. (R., p.105.) Medical staff then informed
Detective Mumford that Mr. Rose’s pants contained marijuana; Detective Mumford then reached
into the right front pocket of Mr. Rose’s pants and seized it. (R., p.105.)
Mr. Rose was charged with aggravated driving under the influence and possession of a
controlled substance. (R., p.54.) He filed a motion to suppress the result of the blood draw and
of the marijuana found in his pants. (R., p.51.) The district court denied the motion with respect
to the blood draw but granted the motion with respect to the marijuana. (R., p.104.)
Regarding the blood draw, the district court relied on Sims v. State, 159 Idaho 249
(Ct. App. 2015) for the proposition that “Idaho’s implied consent statute continues to be valid,
albeit in a form that is revocable.” (R., p.107.) The court concluded that there was no evidence
presented that Mr. Rose withdrew his implied consent, and therefore the “State has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that [Mr.] Rose freely and voluntarily consented to his blood
draw.” (R., p.107.) However the court also noted that “many other jurisdictions do not interpret
the Fourth Amendment in accordance with Sims, and in fact have invalidated so-called
“unconscious- or death-consent provisions” in their respective implied consent statutes.”
(R., pp.107-08.)2 Ultimately, the court concluded that it was bound by stare decisis and could
not distinguish the instant case from Sims. (R., p.108.)

2

Sims involved a blood draw from an unconscious motorist. See 159 Idaho at 252.
2

Mr. Rose then entered into a conditional plea in which he pleaded guilty to aggravated
DUI but preserved his right to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.121.) The
district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with one year fixed and stayed the
execution of the sentence pending appeal. (R., pp.134; 137.) Mr. Rose appealed. (R., p.139.)
On appeal, he asserts that the district court was correct to have concerns about the state of Idaho
law on warrantless blood draws and implied consent, and he respectfully requests that this Court
reconsider its prior decision that have held that a defendant must demonstrate that he or she
withdrew their implied consent.

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rose’s motion to suppress?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rose’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Rose asserts that implied consent cannot, by itself, function as an exception to the

warrant requirement and respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its decisions holding
otherwise.

B.

Standard Of Review
“In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, this Court will

defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous. However, free review is
exercised over a trial court’s determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been
satisfied in light of the facts found.” State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 470 (2001).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rose’s Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment provides that, “The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. It is well-established that a governmental intrusion into the human body
which is attendant to a compelled blood draw is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Halen v. State, 136
Idaho 829, 833 (2002). “Such an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual’s ‘most
personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148
(2013) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)).

5

By its plain language, the Fourth Amendment evinces a preference that governmental
searches and seizures be conducted pursuant to warrants. See United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102, 105-06 (1965). This preference has come to inform the question of what is an
“unreasonable” search or seizure, such that “searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.”
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Accord State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728, 730 (2002). “The exceptions are
jealously and carefully drawn, and there must be a showing by those who seek exemption . . .
that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. [T]he burden is on those
seeking the exemption to show the need for it.” Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455 (internal quotation
marks and footnotes omitted; alterations in Coolidge). Thus, the State bears “a heavy burden” to
justify a warrantless search or seizure. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984);
State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225 (1993).
This case involves the consent exception to the warrant requirement. In State v. Diaz,
this Court cited the relevant portion of Idaho’s implied consent statute, I.C. § 18-8002(1), and
held that, based on the statute, when one drives on Idaho’s roads, one gives irrevocable consent
to blood draws. 144 Idaho 300, 302-03 (2007). However, in Missouri v. McNeely, the United
States Supreme Court held that, “while the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may
support a finding of exigency in a specific case, . . . it does not do so categorically. Whether a
warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case
on the totality of the circumstances.” McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156 (2013). Following McNeely,
Diaz was overruled. In State v. Wulff, the Idaho Supreme Court extrapolated from McNeely,
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reasoning that if there can be no per se exigency rule, nor can there be a per se consent rule; it
then held that any consent implied by I.C. § 18-8002(1) can be withdrawn or revoked. 157 Idaho
416, 420-23 (2014). See also State v. Arotta, 157 Idaho 773, 774 (2014) (re-affirming the
holding of Wulff); State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 645-46 (2014). In so holding, the Court
pointed out that such an interpretation of McNeely is consistent with prior Supreme Court
precedent holding that consent must be voluntary, and the voluntariness of consent is a factual
question (to be proved by the government), which must be analyzed under the totality of the
circumstances. See Wulff, 157 Idaho at 422 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973)).
While Wulff, Halseth, and Arotta held that consent, once implied as a matter of law,
could be withdrawn, they did not specifically address the question of whether consent could be
implied as a matter of law in the first instance. On the one hand, Wulff made it clear that
“implied consent is no longer acceptable when it operates as a per se exception to the warrant
requirement because the [Supreme] Court repeatedly expressed disapproval for categorical
rules,” Wulff, 157 Idaho at 421, but on the other hand, it also went on to state:
Idaho’s implied consent statute must jump two hurdles to qualify as voluntary:
(1) drivers give their initial consent voluntarily and (2) drivers must continue to
give voluntary consent. Drivers in Idaho give their initial consent to evidentiary
testing by driving on Idaho roads voluntarily. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303,
160 P.3d 739, 742 (2007).
Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423. In three subsequent cases, two different panels of the Idaho Court of
Appeals held that, although now revocable, consent may still be implied as a matter of law
pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002(1). See Bobeck v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 159 Idaho 539, 543-45
(Ct. App. 2015), rev. denied (2015); Sims v. State, 159 Idaho 249, 255-57 (Ct. App. 2015), rev.
denied (2015); State v. Smith, 159 Idaho 15, 25-26 (Ct. App. 2015), rev. denied (2015).
However, two judges—Judges Lansing and Gutierrez—disagreed with the notion that consent
7

can be implied as a matter of law. See Bobeck, 159 Idaho at 545-46 (Gutierrez, S., dissenting)
(arguing that “statutorily implied consent is insufficient to satisfy the consent exception to the
warrant requirement” because the Fourth Amendment requires actual consent); Smith, 159 Idaho
at 28-30 (Lansing, K., concurring) (arguing that under the consent exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement, there must be a finding of actual consent; a legal fiction
created by statute will not suffice). More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court has weighed in in
on whether implied consent is valid consent within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
Supreme Court has said that it is.
First, in State v. Eversole, the Court rejected the notion that consent cannot be implied as
a matter of law. 160 Idaho 239, 242-43 (2016). It reasoned that because the McNeely case did
not clearly invalidate “implied consent” statutes, those statutes must be valid for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Id. Specifically, the Eversole Court reasoned that consent implied by law
is valid consent under the Fourth Amendment because: (1) nothing in McNeely “specifically
addressed[ed] the validity of implied consent statutes much less h[e]ld that implied consent
statutes cannot serve as an exception to the warrant requirement”; (2) McNeely’s emphasis on a
“totality of the circumstances test was in regards to the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement, not to implied consent statutes,” (3) “Nowhere does McNeely suggest that
implied consent statutes do not constitute constitutional consent or that a totality of the
circumstances test is the exclusive means for establishing consent”; and (4) McNeely recognized
that implied consent statutes, which provide for administrative penalties if drivers refuses to
submit to evidentiary testing, are among “a broad range of legal tools to enforce [ ] drunk-driving
laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood draws.”
Eversole, 160 Idaho at 243.

8

In State v. Rios, the defendant again apparently argued that consent implied as a matter of
law was not sufficient to establish consent for Fourth Amendment purposes. See 160 Idaho 262,
266 (2016). This Court relied upon Eversole in rejecting the defendant’s argument: “As we
concluded in Eversole, under McNeely, implied consent may satisfy the consent exception to the
warrant requirement. Therefore, actual consent is not required.” Id.
Most recently, in State v. Charlson, this Court assumed that “implied consent” was valid
consent for Fourth Amendment purposes, and held that because the defendant had not withdrawn
the consent that was deemed to exist as a matter of law, the blood draw at issue in that case was
consensual for Fourth Amendment purposes. 160 Idaho 610, 617-18 (2016). The Court quoted
Rios for the proposition that “[u]nder Idaho law, a driver’s implied consent continues if it is not
revoked before the time of evidentiary testing.” Id. at 618. The Court of Appeals has affirmed
these holdings in State v. Ortega-Vastida, 161 Idaho 894 (Ct. App. 2017).
Mr. Rose acknowledges that he did not present evidence that he revoked his implied
consent. Therefore, he acknowledges that if this Court applies the rule from the above-cited
authorities, he did not revoke his implied consent. However, he respectfully requests that this
Court reconsider its prior decisions and now hold that the State must demonstrate actual consent.
Implied consent, by itself, does not satisfy the consent exception to the warrant requirement.
While the Idaho Supreme Court will follow precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis,
it need not do so where: (1) that precedent “is manifestly wrong,” (2) that precedent “it has
proven over time to be unjust or unwise,” or (3) overruling that precedent “is necessary to
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v. Humphreys,
134 Idaho 657, 660 (2000) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77
(1990)).

In this case, Mr. Rose submits that the relevant portions of Eversole, Rios, and
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Charlson are manifestly wrong, in that they are contrary to controlling United States Supreme
Court precedent on the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment, and that because of this
conflict, overruling the relevant portions of Eversole, Rios, and Charlson is necessary to
vindicate plain, obvious Fourth Amendment principles and prevent the deprivation of Idahoans’
Fourth Amendment rights.
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the government has the burden of
proving consent for a given search was freely and voluntarily given, and it has held that the
question of whether consent was so given is a factual question, the resolution of which calls for
an examination of the totality of the circumstances. In Bumper v. North Carolina, the Court
held, “When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has
the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.” 391 U.S. 543,
548 (1968) (quoted with approval in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222, 227 (1973));
accord Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). Later, in Schneckloth, the Court engaged in
a fairly lengthy analysis of what “voluntary consent” means, and it concluded that “the question
whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion,
express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. In other words, for purposes of the consent
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, the government is required to prove
that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant actually consented to the search in
question.

10

In view of the foregoing Supreme Court precedent, it is apparent that Idaho’s “implied
consent” statute cannot, on its own, establish consent for Fourth Amendment purposes. 3 First,
contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court’s analysis in Eversole, it is precisely the type of
impermissible per se standard that was rejected in McNeely and Wulff. Further, it is plainly
inconsistent with the “consent” standards set forth in Bumper, Schneckloth, and their progeny
since: it transforms the relevant inquiry from a factual determination to a legal determination; it
fails to take into account the totality of the circumstances; and rather than requiring the State to
prove voluntary consent, it creates a presumption of consent which the defendant has to
overcome by affirmatively demonstrating revocation.
Finally, to uphold Idaho’s implied consent statute for purposes of determining consent in
the Fourth Amendment context would be to permit the Idaho Legislature to determine Fourth
Amendment standards, which it clearly cannot do. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11
(1979) (state statute which purports to authorize police in some circumstances to make searches
and seizures without probable cause and without search warrants falls within the category of
statutes “purporting to authorize searches without probable cause, which the Court has not
hesitated to hold invalid as authority for unconstitutional searches.”) The United States Supreme

3

Mr. Rose is not asserting that “implied consent” statutes are unconstitutional in all respects. To
the extent they permit a State to impose administrative penalties (such as driver’s license
suspensions) on licensed drivers who refuse evidentiary testing, Mr. Rose concedes they are still
valid. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 443, 554 (1983); see also McNeely, 569 U.S. at
160-61 (“States have a broad range of legal tools to enforce their drunk-driving laws and to
secure BAC evidence without undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood draws. For example,
all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of
operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or
otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense. Such laws impose significant
consequences when a motorist withdraws consent; typically the motorist’s driver’s license is
immediately suspended or revoked, and most States allow the motorist’s refusal to take a BAC
test to be used as evidence against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.”) (citation omitted).
11

Court’s opinion in Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008), is particularly instructive on this
issue. In Moore, the United States Supreme Court held that Virginia police officers did not
violate the Fourth Amendment when they arrested a motorist whom they had probable cause to
believe had violated a Virginia state statute by driving with a suspended license, even though the
state statute did not authorize the officers to arrest the motorist. Moore, 553 U.S. at 166-67, 178.
The Moore Court concluded that state laws do not alter the reasonableness of an arrest for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 173-76. Because the officers had probable cause, the
Court held that the arrest of the motorist was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment despite
the violation of state law. Id. at 178.
The same is true here; Idaho’s implied consent law does not alter the reasonableness of a
search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. And the United States Supreme Court’s
decisions on consent are clear, as was set forth above: the government is required to prove that,
under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant actually consented to the search in
question.
Further, as was noted by the district court in this case, other states have held that implied
consent cannot justify a search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment’s consent exception. In
State v. Havatone, 389 P.3d 1251 (Ariz. 2017), the Arizona Supreme Court noted that Arizona’s
implied consent law deemed an unconscious driver to have consented. Id. at 1255. The court
concluded that, “following McNeely [ . . .] Arizona’s implied consent statute [. . .] does not
relieve the state of establishing voluntary consent or another exception to the warrant
requirement.” Id. The court concluded that “the unconscious clause can be constitutionally
applied only when case-specific exigent circumstances prevent law enforcement officers from
obtaining a warrant.” Id. Further, the Supreme Court of Georgia noted that “sister states have
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considered statutory implied consent as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement in the wake of McNeely” and “what the cases seem to indicate is that mere
compliance with statute implied consent does not, per se equate to actual, and therefore
voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate
of a warrant.” Williams v. State, 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 (Ga. 2015) (citing People v. Harris, 184
Cal.Rptr.3d 198 (2015); Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App. 2014); State v. Padley, 849
N.W.2d 867 (Wis. App. 2014); State v. Moore, 318 P.3d 1133 (Ore. 2013); State v. Brooks, 838
N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013)).
In view of the foregoing precedent, Judges Lansing and Guiterrez were correct when they
penned separate opinions in Smith and Bobeck, respectively. In Smith, Judge Lansing concurred
with the result, but wrote that she would hold that “implied consent” does not constitute
constitutional consent. Smith, 159 Idaho at 657. This is because “implied consent,” “involves no
actual consent at all; the co-called consent is entirely fictitious.”

Id.

As Judge Lansing

explained, “implied consent is a legal fiction created by statute which . . . cannot trump
constitutional guarantees against warrantless intrusions on one’s person or liberty. A legislative
body may not simply legislate away constitutional rights.” Id. at 657-58. Likewise, in Bobeck,
Judge Gutierrez dissented on the basis that the Fourth Amendment requires actual consent, not
merely consent implied as a matter of law. Bobeck, 159 Idaho at 545. He concluded that, “The
totality of the circumstances analysis for determining whether consent is voluntary confirms that
the one circumstance—driving on Idaho roads is insufficient to constitute actual, voluntary
consent.” Id. at 546.
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Rose asserts that Eversole, Rios, and Charlson were
manifestly wrong when they were decided, and they should now be overruled in order to
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vindicate plain, obvious principles of law, and to avoid the injustice attendant to depriving
defendants like Mr. Rose of their Fourth Amendment rights. Mr. Rose urges this Court to apply
the United States Supreme Court’s standard to the question of whether he consented to the blood
draw at issue in this case, not the lesser standard identified by the Idaho Legislature. The
Supreme Court standard, identified in Bumper, Schneckloth, and their progeny, and reflected in
the separate opinions of Judge Lansing and Judge Gutierrez from Smith and Bobeck,
respectively, required the State to prove that Mr. Rose actually consented to the blood draw.
Because Mr. Rose was unconscious, he was unable to actually consent to the blood draw.
In this case, the district court noted that disagreement existed among the states with
regard to the scope of implied consent laws. While the district court was bound by precedent
from this Court, Mr. Rose respectfully asserts that the precedent should be overruled, and that the
district court’s order should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Rose respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 13th day of August, 2018.

/s/ Justin M. Curtis
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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